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In my 2012 book On Global Justice, I argued that humanity’s collective owner-
ship of the earth should be central to reflection on the permissibility of immigration. 
Other philosophers have recently offered accounts of immigration that do without 
the kind of global standpoint provided by collective ownership. I argue here that all 
these attempts fail. but once we see how humanity’s collective ownership of the earth 
can deliver a genuinely global standpoint on immigration, we must also consider two 
alternative ways of offering such a standpoint. First, some have argued that any given 
generation should be regarded as inheriting both the natural and the societal wealth 
of humanity. the second alternative invokes ethno-geographic communities charac-
terized by particular land-use patterns. this approach would deliver a global stand-
point on immigration by determining which community gets to select the land-use 
pattern for a given location. I argue that thinking about immigration from the stand-
point of collective ownership of the earth is superior to both of those alternatives. 
While advancing a standpoint from which to think about questions of immigration/
migration, this article also offers explanations to situate its themes in the current 
philosophical debate and cover quite a range of topics in the debate about immigra-
tion. No prior acquaintance with On Global Justice is presupposed here.
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sECtION I
the European migrant crisis began in 2015, when an increasing number of mi-
grants traversed the Mediterranean or Western asia to reach countries in the EU. 
Hundreds and probably thousands have died in the attempt, many when their boats 
sank in the unruly waters of the Mediterranean. the Us and australia too have long 
been prominent destinations of migrants, of course. as the 21st century progresses, 
climate change will generate new population movements. Generally, migration and 
immigration will be among the defining topics of this century. Does political philoso-
phy have anything to say about such population movements?
My 2012 book On Global Justice (hereafter OGJ) devotes much room to an idea 
that was the pivotal thought in the political philosophy of the 17th century but has 
since attracted less attention: that humanity collectively owns the earth. that idea 
helps with the question I just posed. by ownership, I hasten to add, I do not mean here 
the concrete provisions of ownership in the civil law. Practical speaking we can think 
of ownership as intergenerational trusteeship. With that idea developed in a secular 
and (hopefully) plausible manner, the book explores several contemporary issues in 
its light, among them climate change (if humanity owns the planet in common, this 
must have implications for what we should do about cleaning up the atmosphere, 
and who should bear the costs), obligations to future generations (ownership of the 
planet stretches over generations, making the present one caretakers for future gen-
erations), and finally immigration.
as far as immigration is concerned, OGJ formulates an account of proportionate 
use of collectively owned resources and spaces and argues that a country that underuses its 
share ought to admit more immigrants. If we think of immigration in terms of popu-
lation movements across a collectively owned planet, we recognize that immigration 
policies are not entirely discretionary. that is, it is not exclusively up to a state to 
decide what kind of immigration it wishes to have. Instead, contrary to current politi-
cal practice, immigration policies must be assessed from a global standpoint, the stan-
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dard of assessment being whether policies accommodate a proportionate number of 
people.1
a common reaction has been that OGJ overstates the significance of collective 
ownership for immigration. My approach ignores what motivates migrants: people 
move to live in a safer environment or a stronger economy, not to enjoy shares of 
resources or spaces. but what motivates people and what is permissible or obligatory are 
different topics that we must explore on their own terms. Here I aim to develop my 
approach further by defending it against the charge of overstating the importance of 
collective ownership of the earth for immigration. I hope to be able to show that re-
flection on collective ownership is essential for sound theorizing about immigration, 
and thus also for sound theorizing about the population movements with which we 
began. I also hope to demonstrate that reflection on collective ownership generally is 
an important and currently neglected idea in political philosophy.
since this essay is for a general readership, section 2 introduces my approach to 
global justice. In an introductory spirit, section 3 then reflects on how to integrate 
questions about immigration into a theory of global justice, developing the distinc-
tion between ideal and non-ideal theory. section 4 explains what role there is in 
debates about immigration for collective ownership of the earth. sections 5 and 6 
engage with some contemporary authors who offer an account of immigration “one 
state at a time.” all identify good reasons that entitle states to restrict immigration. 
these approaches turn out to be incomplete or misguided for failing to consider im-
migration from a genuinely global standpoint. theorists who accept states and their 
right to exclude must wonder about the costs imposed on non-members by main-
taining such a system, “costs,” that is, consisting of the denial of entry to some who 
would like to move to the respective country. Reflection on collective ownership fills 
that lacuna.2
However, my response to those authors generates an objection that cuts to the 
core of my approach. suppose I am right that we need a view of the fair distribution 
1. Oberman (2011) states that there is a consensus in the literature that wealthy countries can 
choose between allowing people from poor countries to immigrate and helping them where they are. 
My view is not part of that consensus. Under-using countries should permit immigration.
2. For most of the social science and legal literature on immigration the question of whether states 
are allowed to constrain immigration at all does not arise. Readers who approach the philosophical 
literature before this background may therefore be surprised about the extent to which the sheer 
acceptability of immigration constraints has become a philosophical problem. a symptomatic recent 
statement by a social scientist working on immigration is this: “Only from the wilder shores of 
libertarianism and utilitarianism can it be argued that immigration controls are ethically illegitimate” 
(Collier (2013), p 246). Much of the philosophical interest in immigration has been fueled by the fact 
that that same view can also be supported from less “wild” shores.
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of people across the earth to articulate a globally acceptable stance on immigration. 
agreement this far does not by itself imply that we should develop such an account 
entirely in terms of proportionate use of resources and spaces. First of all, one may argue 
the proportionate distribution should involve proportionality vis-à-vis overall wealth, 
including both natural and societal wealth. sure enough, the argument goes, any new 
generation has done nothing to create natural resources. but nor have they done any-
thing to create any societal wealth. so, much like natural resources, inherited societal 
wealth should be seen as collectively owned by humanity as a whole. this is a power-
ful objection that would radically alter how my approach bears on immigration. In 
response, sections 8 and 9 discuss the differences between societal and natural re-
sources. Contrary to those who agree that proportionate use matters to immigration 
but insist the common pool includes societal resources, I argue that pool does in fact 
exclude such resources.
Yet another account does agree that it is indeed natural resources and spaces with 
regard to which we should assess the distribution of people. but instead of propor-
tionality, another manner of assessing that distribution is employed. Political theorist 
avery Kolers (2009) uses the term “ethno-geographic community” to emphasize that 
communities adopt land-use patterns to control and shape spaces, patterns that in 
turn shape their culture. their conception (“ontology”) of land materializes through 
acts of bounding, controlling and shaping space. Kolers’s view permits a global stand-
point, one that prescribes whose ontology of land matters in any given region and 
thereby determines fairness in the distribution of people without drawing on con-
siderations of proportionality in any way. I discuss Kolers’s account in section 10, 
but I argue that his account of ethno-geographic communities fails to undermine the 
significance of collective ownership for immigration. Of the three different ways of 
developing a global standpoint on immigration, then, I hope to persuade the reader 
that the concept of collective ownership of the earth is most plausible and worthy of 
more attention in the globalized world of the 21st century.
before we reach the discussion of these two alternative ways of devising a global 
standpoint, section 7 responds to some substantial objections to my account of col-
lective ownership of the earth raised by Malcolm bull’s 2013 review of OGJ in the 
London Review of Books. Responding to his concerns here serves the purpose of clari-
fying important aspects of my approach. My discussion of bull’s objections bene-
fits from the discussion of competing proposals on immigration in sections 5 and 6. 
section 11 concludes.
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sECtION II
Let me locate OGJ in the global-justice literature. Justice has been a major subject 
in Western philosophy since Plato and aristotle. Generically, justice is impartiality 
in the assessment of what is deserved. One kind of justice is distributive justice. the 
meaning of “distributive” justice has varied enormously throughout history, but in 
recent times its guiding question has come to be about the ways political and eco-
nomic institutions are arranged and thus about how benefits of social cooperation 
accrue to individuals. according to a common view, demands of justice are the most 
stringent ingredients of morality: what justice requires has priority and permits 
fewest compromises.
Many philosophers think we must stand in a rather dense relationship for such 
demanding consideration to apply. For instance, they do not think that being loosely 
connected at the global level through trade relations even implies the need for con-
siderations of justice. as opposed to that, a situation of shared citizenship has struck 
many as the kind of relationship, and in fact as the only one, where considerations 
of justice do apply. that is, questions about just distribution arise among citizens, 
but not among people who do not share the same state. Mexicans among each other, 
americans among each other, or Japanese among each other stand in what we might 
call a justice-relationship; they can debate with each other how to distribute what 
they create together. but a group consisting of Mexicans, americans and Japanese is 
not jointly subject to the same principles of distributive justice, whatever those may 
be.
In a politically and economically highly interconnected world, we must ask what 
justice requires globally. as an alternative to the traditional view just sketched cosmo-
politan views have arisen which apply distributive justice to all human beings —either 
because the right political and economic structures within which justice applies is 
not the state, but the global order or world society, or else because justice applies to 
all human beings as such, regardless of any structures. but neither the traditional nor 
the cosmopolitan approach is satisfactory. the traditional view overemphasizes the 
importance of states; the cosmopolitan view is too dismissive of their importance. 
OGJ rejects both approaches and instead recognizes different considerations or con-
ditions based on which individuals are in the scope of then different principles of 
justice. Finding a convincing alternative to those two aforementioned approaches to 
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my mind is the most important challenge contemporary political philosophy faces, 
one that reflects the significance of the political issues at stake.
My view in OGJ, and thus my own attempt at meeting the aforementioned chal-
lenge, recognizes the existence of multiple grounds of justice. Grounds are the proper-
ties of individuals that make it the case that particular principles of justice apply to 
them. OGJ seeks to present a foundational theory that makes it plausible that there 
could be multiple grounds and defends a specific view of the grounds I call pluralist 
internationalism. Pluralist internationalism grants particular normative relevance to 
states but qualifies their relevance by embedding the state into other grounds associ-
ated with their own principles of justice and by imposing additional obligations on 
those who share membership in a state. the grounds I discuss are shared member-
ship in a state, common humanity, shared membership in the global order, shared 
involvement with the global trading system and humanity’s collective ownership of 
the earth. there may well be other grounds, but our political realities make these 
five especially relevant. OGJ explores these grounds, proposes particular principles 
applicable to them, and demonstrates the fruitfulness of this approach to justice by 
thinking through what it implies for a range of challenges that come up for moral 
evaluation.
What may seem an unexpected item on my list of grounds is humanity’s col-
lective ownership of the earth. the idea that humanity collectively owned the earth 
was the pivotal thought of 17th century political philosophy. authors such as Hugo 
Grotius, samuel Pufendorf, John selden, Robert Filmer, thomas Hobbes and John 
Locke all had views on the matter. It is unsurprising that collective ownership became 
so important then. the 17th century was when European colonialism came into its 
own. Genuinely global questions arose for European thinkers for the first time then, 
if only regarding their interaction with each other in far-away lands. the central 
source for humanity’s collective ownership of the earth was the divine gift of the 
earth recorded in Genesis. In those religiously troubled times the Old testament was 
as credible a foundational text as was available in that debate.
the concept of humanity’s collective ownership of the earth is worth revitalizing 
even though we must now do so in a secular manner so as not to preclude its general 
acceptability from the outset. such a revitalization is both feasible and tremendously 
important. at this stage in history, humanity confronts problems of planetary pro-
portions. the destruction of our habitat is possible. In response political philosophy 
must make the planet as such central to reflection. the collective ownership involved 
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is more abstract than ownership in the civil law. the point is to articulate the idea 
that the earth’s resources and spaces are needed by all humans for everything we do 
whereas their existence is nobody’s accomplishment. Of any two humans, no matter 
when and where they live, neither has done more to create the planet. to the extent 
that we are entitled to resources and spaces, any two humans have equal entitlements.
I say “to the extent” since my secular revitalization does not indulge human 
chauvinism: the most plausible view on the value of animals and ecosystems (what-
ever that may most plausibly turn out to be) is consistent with humanity as such col-
lectively owning the planet in the sense sketched. after all, collective ownership of 
the earth as I understand it only applies among human beings, and thus assigns en-
titlements to resources and spaces of the earth that are in the domain of what humans 
are entitled to (that is, after concerns about animals and the environment for its own 
sake have been factored in).
so far these ideas have been intuitive, but there is substantive philosophical 
work to be done, the details of which, however, do not concern us now. to summarize 
briefly, OGJ explores various conceptions of humanity’s collective ownership, that 
is, several ways of developing what is meant by “collective ownership.” I argue that 
one of them (what I call Common Ownership) is philosophically preferred. Common 
Ownership of the earth, roughly speaking, is parallel to ownership of village commons 
in the old days: an entitlement to an equal opportunity to use certain resources to 
satisfy one’s needs. to illustrate what it means to offer a principle of justice for a 
ground of justice, I offer the following principle pertaining to humanity’s collective 
ownership of the earth: the distribution of original resources and spaces of the earth 
among the global population is just only if everyone has the opportunity to use them 
to satisfy their basic needs, or otherwise lives under a property arrangement that pro-
vides the opportunity to satisfy basic needs. In the course of several chapters OGJ 
argues that this principle has important implications for immigration, climate change 
and obligations to future generations.
OGJ seeks to exemplify the work philosophy can do to help solve the world’s 
political and economic problems, especially those raised by globalization. attempts 
at solving such problems generate questions about what kind of world we desire. 
Philosophical inquiry rarely generates policy advice unless much of what people 
believe and how our institutions work is taken as constraining such advice. 
Nonetheless, we need visions for the world’s future. If such visions dispense with 
philosophy, they forfeit conceptual tools needed to defend them. at the same time, 
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political thought that proceeds with too little connection to problems that preoccupy 
those who seek to change the world is complacent and boring, as is philosophical 
inquiry that mostly investigates its own nature.
sECtION III
Let us turn to immigration, starting with some thoughts on why immigration 
is a vexing subject for political philosophers. Much confusion exists in the litera-
ture because it is often not clearly distinguished how discussion of immigration in 
so-called “ideal theory” differs from “non-ideal theory” (terms I define below) and 
there is frequently little clarity of what is required of an ideal-theory treatment of 
immigration.
Reflection on immigration is challenging partly because proposed policy changes 
are often plausible only if other policies also change. suppose somebody advises 
against more immigration because what immigration a country could expect decreas-
es low-income wages. this argument assumes no additional social policies are avail-
able. Or one might argue wealthier countries had better not admit more immigrants 
because their inhabitants pollute too much. but that argument takes environmen-
tally unacceptable behavior as given instead of insisting that wealthy countries must 
pay more heed to the environment anyway. Generally, using philosophy for practical 
recommendations, we can rarely make proposals on only one subject. We must make 
a set of interconnected proposals. If the whole set cannot be implemented, we must 
see what guidance (if any) is available. Political philosophy constrained by what is po-
litically possible in the short run is of little interest. still, for political thought to bear 
on reality it must be realistically utopian. It must be constrained by what is politically 
doable in the long run, or at least by what is economically, biologically or physically 
possible. It is crucial to be clear on how such possibilities constrain one’s views, and 
to be consistent in one’s choice of what kind of possibility constrains theorizing.
so it matters greatly whether we think about immigration in ideal or non-ideal 
theory. We assess immigration under conditions of ideal theory if we assume that in 
all other regards the world is as it should be as far as justice is concerned. We do so 
under conditions of non-ideal theory if we assume that in some other regards, the 
world is not as it should be. For some approaches to global justice, questions about 
immigration arise only non-ideally. Immigration occurs only if borders exist. If ideal 
theory abolishes borders no question about acceptable immigration arises. What 
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such theories entail for non-ideal cases depends on the nature of the constraints 
separating real-life conditions from ideal theory. Here I am not interested in theo-
ries that hold that ideal theory excludes states but in theories that hold the opposite. 
anybody who accepts that there are states in ideal theory owes a justification of states, 
one aspect of which is to show how particular principles of justice apply only within 
states. However, no such account by itself has strong implications for immigration. 
What one can show in this way is at most that immigration does not have to be en-
tirely unconstrained. an account of how immigration can be legitimately constrained 
must be added.
Is it possible that in ideal theory states may regulate immigration as they see fit? 
this will be so if one regards immigration as purely remedial. a remedial measure is 
one that must be offered because substantive claims have been violated. thus im-
migration is remedial if offered in response to violations that are not by themselves 
matters of population distribution across countries. Immigration is purely remedial if 
only offered in such a way. sometimes immigration is considered a remedy to inad-
equate living conditions in countries of origin (either because then the immigrants 
themselves would be aided, or because third parties benefit from the fact that they 
immigrate, e.g., because they send remittances). by definition, remedial immigra-
tion is absent in ideal theory (since the violations that trigger such immigration are 
absent). so if immigration is purely remedial, ideal theory need not concern itself with 
it. However, in section 5, when discussing the work of Michael blake, we encounter 
an example of severe underuse of resources under conditions of ideal theory. that 
kind of example shows that we should not think of immigration as purely remedial. 
For now let us assume that point has already been established.
We should take note in passing of one approach that, like mine, also does not 
treat immigration as purely remedial, to wit, Martha Nussbaum’s version of the capa-
bility approach to human flourishing. Nussbaum offers a list of capabilities central to 
a dignified life. “bodily integrity” appears, and “being able to move freely from place 
to place” is one instantiation of bodily integrity (2006, p 76). Views of global justice 
that regard immigration as purely remedial, one might insist, miss this kind of moral 
significance of immigration.3
However, an appeal to the relevance of bodily integrity, or other appeals to the 
importance of freedom, do not compel us to accept a freedom-based approach to im-
migration according to which there would be a primary right to immigration that is 
3. For the significance of open borders for human freedom, see also Carens (2013), chapter 11.
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in no way (and thus certainly not purely) remedial. One might say, alongside Miller 
(2005), that the right to free movement is not inexhaustible but best captured as a 
threshold. a legitimate concern with freedom of movement (or bodily integrity) is 
fully met if everybody has some space to move around. Concerns with the moral sig-
nificance of physical movement as such would therefore not undermine the claim 
that a right to immigration is purely remedial. Moreover, it is also true that many 
ordinary laws—including private property laws, traffic regulations, no-loitering or-
dinances, park closing hours—already limit free movement. It is therefore hard to be 
overly impressed with an appeal to freedom in the immigration debate. Freedom can 
play a part on all sides of the immigration debate.
sECtION IV
Let me now explain my own take on immigration in terms of collective owner-
ship of the earth. We have seen so far that if indeed immigration is not purely remedi-
al, a theory of global justice must address immigration under both ideal and non-ideal 
conditions (and, again, be careful about when it addresses which kind of condition). 
What such a theory has to say under non-ideal conditions depends on the nature 
of the deviation from ideal circumstances. Nothing much can be said at the abstract 
level. but without such complications ideal theory can and must address immigration. 
specifically, the ideal theory we are after here is one that tell us under what condi-
tions states, for moral reasons, ought to allow immigration, and how much. Unlike 
Nussbaum’s approach in terms of freedom, OGJ does so by resorting to humanity’s 
collective ownership of the earth. Part 1 of OGJ offers an account of what I call the “nor-
mative peculiarity of the state,” that is, the conditions that make it the case that 
particular principles of justice only hold among those who share membership in a 
state. the answer is that those who share such membership are subject to particular 
forms of coercion and expected to participate in a certain form of cooperation. Far-
reaching principles of justice govern the distribution of goods produced under those 
conditions.
but since indeed this kind of answer leaves open what counts as an appropriate 
response to immigration demands, Part 2 turns to collective ownership to fill precisely 
that lacuna: states may not exclude people from entering if and as long as they under-
use their share of collectively owned resources and spaces. a population underuses its share 
of three-dimensional space if the per-capita value of what they occupy is higher than 
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the world average across states. the average person in such a state can access more 
resources than people can on a per-country average. they overuse if the per-capita 
value of what they occupy is lower than the world average among states. Underusers 
can be reasonably expected to permit immigration. Overusers may decline further 
requests for immigration. they do enough in permitting a share of humanity to make 
a living.
For a state to offer a home to “sufficiently many” people means their number 
is proportionate to the value for human purposes of the resources and spaces thus 
removed from general use. a host of biophysical factors shape the value of a ter-
ritory for human purposes, as do technological constraints. territories of the same 
size might differ vastly in terms of soil quality, resource endowment, climatic condi-
tions and other variables. No good measure assessing the value for human purposes 
of three-dimensional spaces of the earth is currently available. sustained scientific 
effort would be needed to obtain one. but the basic idea should be clear: propor-
tionate distribution of humans across the planet must be spelled out in terms of a 
measure that evaluates what humans can actually do with a region of the earth.
It should not be up to the discretion of extraterritorial entities what kind of im-
migration a state should permit. such regulation would undermine any prospects of 
the state’s building an enduring collective spirit needed to maintain trust in everyday 
life. at least that is so for non-trivial numbers of immigrants.4 so if we grant that 
states exist in ideal theory, leaving control over immigration to an extraterritorial 
entity is not an option; the question is only whether states should have complete 
discretion, or whether immigration policies should be subject to moral constraints 
justifiable to both people in the country and outsiders. that second case I develop in 
terms of collective ownership of the earth. We could then debate separately whether 
immigration should be administered from within the country or partly from outside.5
so OGJ proposes a response to the problem that an account of the normative pe-
culiarity of states does not have an account of immigration “built in.” this approach 
in terms of proportionate use integrates the concerns of those whom immigration 
policies would exclude. they cannot be reasonably expected to accept a state’s im-
4. Collier (2013) argues that moderate amounts of immigration are beneficial for host countries, but 
that a rapid influx of many immigrants may well undermine social trust. this will be so especially the 
more immigration increases diversity. For the link between diversity and trust, see Putnam (2007).
5. “Perhaps partly:” in cases of conflict in how to interpret policies the state should have a major 
say, for the same reason that excluded discretionary immigration policies decided by external enti-
ties.
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migration policies if that state underuses its resources and spaces and thus fails to 
provide a location for a proportionate share of the world’s population. but this re-
sponse requires further elaboration. specifically, I must defend it against accounts 
that build on the normative peculiarity of the state without integrating a global stand-
point, as well as against views that agree an account of immigration must include a 
global standpoint but develop that standpoint differently.
the remainder of this study, beginning in section 5, takes up those tasks. but 
before proceeding, let me note that refugees come up for special treatment in OGJ. 
In international law (specifically according to the 1951 Convention on Refugees), a 
refugee is a person with “a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”6 
but for the needed contrast with immigrants we should use a broader and more 
commonsensical notion of refugee not filtered through international politics. More 
broadly, refugees are people who, on account of adverse conditions at home, either 
permanently or temporarily cannot maintain a minimally decent life. Often re-
location under such conditions is outright flight in the face of war or persecution. 
International law grants refugee status under such conditions (which is not a claim to 
membership elsewhere but a claim not to be sent back to the home country, and thus 
is consistent with being sent elsewhere). but it might also be for economic reasons 
that people cannot make a decent living. this could be because of natural disasters, 
mismanagement or a callous regime. as opposed to refugees, immigrants wish to re-
locate although their lives are not in as dire straits. there is a continuum between 
clear cases of refuge and immigration. What the cases have in common is that obliga-
tions towards both groups apply at the level of the global order as such.
OGJ offers a particular take on refugees. Human beings are co-owners of the 
earth. states may exclude others only if they (states) do their share to make sure they 
can make a living where they reside. Otherwise people cannot be prevented from 
exercising their liberty rights and moving elsewhere. a case in point is the refugee 
crisis in in the Mediterranean. First of all, qua humans, people have a claim to aid 
against the rest of the world. a duty of assistance in building institutions applies 
(OGJ, chapter 4). but this duty comes up against the limits of what is feasible to do 
from the outside. secondly, these people are independently entitled to move to un-
derusing countries. thirdly, if it is not feasible to offer aid in building institutions, or 
6. see, e.g., http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c125.html
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if it simply does not happen, then those who leave, qua co-owners of the earth, have 
a claim against the rest of the world to be permitted to move.7
sECtION V
Let us turn to accounts of immigration that were recently offered by philoso-
phers who agree with me on the normative peculiarity of states but deny that an 
account of immigration needs to include a global standpoint. as we will see, attempts 
to delineate the state’s right to exclude fail if they do not properly consider from a 
global standpoint the burdens imposed on those excluded by immigration policies.
among authors who think states should be allowed to constrain immigration 
Michael blake (2013) is unusual in severely limiting a state’s possibilities for doing 
so. a state’s right to exclude people from poor and oppressive countries is generally 
weak. Let us see why he thinks that and why there would be a problem with his ap-
proach because of the omission of a global standpoint.
blake argues that what is crucial in the right to exclude is that the state is a territo-
rial and legal community. the state’s territory delineates a jurisdiction within which 
its laws are effective. Whoever migrates into a jurisdiction obligates its inhabitants 
to protect her human rights, which constrains the freedom of current inhabitants. 
the question becomes under what circumstances—and vis-a-vis which would-be 
immigrants—states may refuse to accept such obligations. For blake states may do so 
only if the country of origin adequately protects human rights. Otherwise, migrants 
acquire rights-protections upon entry. Force used to prevent entry is illegitimate. 
after all, blake thinks that human beings have not only basic human rights, but also 
rights to the circumstances under which these rights are protected. so if their human 
rights are not protected in their country of origin, they are entitled to move to a dif-
ferent location where their rights will be protected. It is for this reason that a state’s 
right to turn away would-be immigrants from poor and oppressive states is generally 
weak. Whereas Christopher Wellman (2008) allows states to purchase the right to 
exclude by supporting development in poor countries, blake insists we cannot justify 
7. Oberman (2011) argues for a “right to stay.” His opponents are those who argue that wealthy 
states can choose between permitting immigration or helping the poor where they are. Oberman 
insists there is no such choice: if the poor prefer to stay, they should be supported where they live. 
My view does not endorse such a choice at the level of ideal theory, such a choice may arise in non-
ideal theory. also, as we just saw, OGJ is consistent with a right to stay because I argue for a duty of 
assistance for poor countries (associated with common humanity as a ground of justice).
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force against one person (which we would exercise by denying them entry) by provid-
ing benefits to others.
 I agree that people are entitled to an environment where they can exercise basic 
rights (Risse (2012), chapter 4). but I disagree about the conditions when states may 
reject migrants. Note that blake’s account falls silent once poverty and oppression are 
eradicated. suppose we live under conditions of ideal theory: all duties of justice are 
met, domestically and internationally, but questions of immigration remain unset-
tled. are people still entitled to move? People may enter if their right to appropriate 
conditions to realize their rights is not met where they live. blake does not say they 
are entitled to enter only if that is so. but the spirit of his discussion makes immigra-
tion remedial. so his answer to the question posed must be negative.
a purely remedial theory of immigration like blake’s—one that thinks of immi-
gration only as a solution to existing problems—is problematic. Let me elaborate on 
that point in the context of blake’s theory (thereby finally completing the discussion 
from section 3). suppose a mysterious disease shrinks the population of the Us to a 
few people without affecting other regions. With technological aids the survivors can 
exclude migrants. suppose oppression and poverty have been eradicated globally. 
Nobody lives under circumstances that entitle her to move. blake cannot find any-
thing morally problematic with these few americans refusing to share. but this case 
to my mind shows that immigration is not purely remedial. It also shows that there 
is a distributional component to any plausible account of immigration. People may 
move into the depopulated Us because the remaining americans occupy a dispropor-
tionate share of resources and spaces.
but if in ideal theory we should think about immigration in a way that includes 
a distributional component then non-ideal theory cannot entirely lack such a compo-
nent. Often migrants desire to move to a location with special ties to their homeland 
and that therefore may have a special obligation to take them. Cases in point would 
be obligations of former colonial powers. but more commonly people determined to 
leave a poor or dysfunctional country simply wish to join any country with better 
prospects. to the extent that there are duties to provide such prospects, all countries 
that could do so have them, and must divide them up.
suppose some such people arrive in country C. For blake, C is obligated to create 
conditions where they can realize their rights. C is not entitled to try to keep them 
out to avoid a situation where it becomes responsible in that way. but that seems 
wrong. C’s duty towards the migrants is no different from that of any country that 
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can provide the circumstances under which migrants could realize their rights. C has 
an obligation to all people in this kind of situation, and all such people have a claim 
against countries like C. C has obligations only qua member of the global order. 
Would-be immigrants have claims against the global order, not specifically against 
C.8 C is a duty-bearer only as part of the global order. this again leads to distribution-
al considerations. Countries must divide up would-be immigrants. all of this applies 
especially to the European refugee crisis. these refugees have a claim against the 
global order as such rather than against the countries they reach first (say, Greece or 
Italy) or that happen to be positively disposed (say, Germany or sweden). Responding 
to their needs is a global responsibility. blake’s theory is wanting for not considering 
immigration from a global standpoint that captures an idea of proportionate distribu-
tion but instead sees immigration as purely remedial, on a country-by-country basis.9
What is a country supposed to do if others fail to do their share? there are two 
major views on the general question of what an agent (individual, country, etc.) ought 
to do if others refuse to do their share. One view (e.g., Cullity (2004)) holds that an 
agent then must do more, as much as she can. the competing view (e.g., Murphy 
(2000)) holds that she should still do as much as she should if everybody did comply. 
My inclinations lie with the latter view. but it matters what, and how much, one 
would sacrifice doing more than required under full compliance, and how morally 
significant it would be if these supererogatory actions (actions beyond the call of 
duty) were performed. If one is called upon to do more than required if everybody 
else does their share, one should make the more of that kind of effort the less of a 
sacrifice it would be, and the more significant the matter is.
these issues are complex. suppose I see somebody drown at the beach and many 
others see it too. surely I have a duty of rescue even if nobody else moves. If another 
person drowns and again nobody else moves, I have the same duty. If the same con-
tinues to happen, my duty continues to apply, as long as I can manage to do so. there 
is too much at stake for the person whose life might be lost. If there were less at stake 
8. Chapter 11 of OGJ explains what it means to have obligations to the global order, but the basic 
idea should be clear enough: these are obligations that all human beings share.
9.  (1) a similar point can be made against Huemer (2010), who argues that immigration constraints 
are prima facie harmful and coercive in a way that cannot be outweighed by a range of standard 
considerations (negative effect on job markets, state’s obligation to its poorest, etc.) (2) Carens (2013) 
draws attention to difficulties that could arise if the country where claims to entry are accepted were 
different from the country where people get to live. It may not always be a good idea literally to di-
vide up immigrants or asylum seekers. but a country that would accept many new people should get 
credit when it comes to other obligations.
Journal of Practical Ethics
 MATHIAS RISSE46
for the persons whom everybody else ignores, I could cease my efforts earlier: enough 
will be enough even before I have exhausted myself.
In this spirit there is a strong obligation for wealthy countries to support ref-
ugees who seek to leave war or drought zones even if others fail to do so and one 
has done one’s share under ideal circumstances (one’s share under conditions where 
everybody does theirs). Let me offer an illustration in terms of a scenario where a 
claim to overcrowding was actually made explicitly. In august 1942, swiss politician 
Eduard von steiger notoriously argued that switzerland was like a small lifeboat that 
was over-crowded, and therefore should not accept more Jewish refugees (schütt and 
Pollmann (1987), pp 540f). but switzerland should have done more than it was doing 
at the time, given how much was at stake for the Jews, and regardless of what support 
was offered by others. that same point applies to other scenarios where people flee 
from actual destruction. If we are talking about immigrants who clearly do not count 
as refugees there would be no reason to do more than one’s share. and then there 
will be many intermediate cases.
sECtION VI
a need for distributional considerations emerged from blake’s own manner of 
deriving obligations to would-be immigrants. His view is incomplete without a global 
standpoint. again, among philosophers who agree on the normative peculiarity of 
the state blake acknowledges unusually far-reaching obligations towards would-be 
immigrants. My purpose currently is to show that attempts to delineate the state’s 
right to exclude fail if they do not properly consider from a global standpoint burdens 
imposed on those excluded by immigration policies. some approaches are problem-
atic because they do not consider the burdens imposed on others convincingly, and 
blake’s is among them. Others are problematic because they do not consider these 
burdens at all. One such account appears in Christopher Wellman (2008), who ad-
vocates for a state’s right to restrict immigration in terms of freedom of association. 
For Wellman, a state is not even required to accept refugees, let alone immigrants. 
all such choices are discretionary. Let me introduce the three arguments Wellman 
offers, and then explain how they are problematic.
First of all, a right to self-determination entitles countries to associate with 
others as they see fit. If one denies that legitimate states have such a right, one could 
not explain why they should not be forced into mergers. It would presumably be un-
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acceptable then for the Us to annex Canada. Canadians have the right of freedom of 
association. but then they should be allowed to regulate immigration as they see fit. 
the second argument turns on the significance of freedom of association for people’s 
lives. People care deeply about their country. therefore they also care about policies 
that shape how their countries evolve. Wellman considers freedom of association an 
integral part of self-determination. as an individual’s freedom of association entitles 
one to remain single, a state’s freedom of association entitles it to exclude foreigners. 
the third argument turns on the weight of responsibility entailed by shared member-
ship in a state. there are special responsibilities of distributive justice among fellow 
citizens. that generates a reason to limit the number of people with whom one shares 
that relationship. Wellman recognizes the arbitrariness of one’s place of birth, but 
denies that this point outweighs concerns of self-determination. Even help for refu-
gees takes the disjunctive form of either sheltering them, or else of intervening to 
create a safe place where they originate.
However, as soon as we have in sight ideas about fairly sharing the earth we also 
see the limitations of freedom of association as an idea that allows states to regu-
late immigration entirely as they please. People do not associate on an infinite plain. 
they occupy parts of a planet with limited spaces and resources that must be shared. 
My example of the dwindled Us population makes that point. the survivors have 
freedom of association. However, their association must occur somewhere. since for 
now humanity is limited to this planet, the amount of space that can be claimed by 
any group claiming its freedom of association is limited. Humanity’s collective own-
ership of the earth captures that point.
Notice how the considerations from the last paragraph engage Wellman’s argu-
ments. We can ignore the third since it is much like blake’s argument. and indeed, 
the Us should refrain from annexing Canada. that is so, in part, because Canadians 
have freedom of association. but that does not imply Canadians may claim as much 
space as they wish. both of these claims are true: (a) the Us may not annex Canada, 
partly because Canadians have freedom of association; (b) Canadians must adopt 
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immigration policies to make sure they exercise their freedom in an appropriate 
territory.10
What if Canada refused to adopt an appropriate immigration policy? Would the 
Us then be allowed to annex Canada punitively, at least a chunk of territory up to a 
point where Canadians occupy a proportionate area? they would not, even if they 
themselves are in full compliance otherwise. a country does not forfeit its right to 
existence if it does not adopt a morally appropriate immigration policy. However, if 
the world as a whole was getting serious about implementing an immigration regime 
along the lines sketched here, substantial international pressure on countries that 
refuse to do their part would be appropriate. as always we must remember that any 
kind of intervention must be weighed against prudential concerns, and that moral 
reasons of any sort should not be used as pretext to pursue goals motivated very 
differently.
but what if the Us lost much of its territory to devastation related to climate 
change, to the point that americans could no longer meet basic needs but Canadians 
refused to share territory? In the 2004 blockbuster The Day After Tomorrow climate 
change suddenly triggers a new ice age in the Us. In response, massive evacuations 
(not to Canada but) to Mexico occur. In such a scenario there would be a duty of the 
neighboring country to host people, and what counts as proportionate use would 
change. at the same time, unless the evacuation affects largely unpopulated areas, 
the host’s jurisdiction must be accepted (assuming that state accepts its obligation to 
share its space). this is not an academic point. In all likelihood, the Us will not lose 
the habitability of much territory to climate change any time (very) soon. but other 
countries will, especially small-island and low-lying coastal states. such countries 
have similar entitlements.
Wellman’s last argument is about the significance of self-determination. It is 
proper that people care about how their country evolves. but this evolution again 
occurs in shared space. Within limits people may choose immigrants. so the sheer 
fact that the evolution of a country occurs in shared space does not mean people en-
10. Lister (2010) uses freedom of association to argue all states must allow a degree of family-based 
immigration, and that this is a duty owed to its citizens. see White (1997) for general discussion of 
the connection between freedom of association and the right to exclude. there is a right to immi-
grate, says Miller (2005), but it is like a right to marriage: one needs to find a willing partner. but the 
marriage analogy is misleading. Nothing about marriage is analogous to the spatial distributional 
component in immigration because nothing about marriage is analogous to natural ownership rights 
to the locations where the association would occur.
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tirely lose control over the policies that shape their country. It does mean, however, 
that they must share their spaces with an appropriate number of people.
What about the point that aid can be provided in different ways? For many ob-
ligations it will not matter how the duty bearers make good on them. this is espe-
cially so if we are talking about remedial duties. after all, the point of such duties is 
to provide relief from hardship. Perhaps a monetary transfer brings relief. Perhaps 
relocation does. but again, immigration is not merely about aid. there is an irreduc-
ibly spatial and distributional aspect to immigration. It could be part of an overall 
agreement on immigration that a country would shoulder its share of global obliga-
tions in ways other than by admitting more immigrants, and designated would-be im-
migrants could agree to renounce their right to entry. but this could not permissibly 
be a unilateral decision by the destination country.
this discussion of blake and Wellman makes the basic point about the impor-
tance of the distributional component of immigration. Let me sketch how the same 
point arises for other authors. David Miller (2005) presents two reasons for limiting 
immigration. First, he insists on the importance of a shared public culture that partly 
constitutes political identity, something people have an interest in controlling as it 
changes. Moreover, and this is similar to Wellman, Miller thinks the population is 
rightly concerned with size because worries about quality of life and the environ-
ment relate to population density. Miller’s points are valid. but in light of the need to 
share this planet they cannot be used to infer that the state may limit immigration as 
it sees fit. Finally, Ryan Pevnick (2011) argues that those who have created a political 
community have property rights over institutions that maintain that community. For 
this reason they can exclude others. Pevenick thinks these rights sometimes get over-
ruled. What he has in mind is remedial use of immigration. In what now is a familiar 
pattern, Pevnick too ignores that ownership of institutions is superimposed on col-
lective ownership of spaces where they are established.
sECtION VII
Next I address some objections to my account raised by Malcolm bull (2013) in 
a review of OGJ in the London Review of Books. addressing these objections allows 
me to elaborate on the contents of my proposal. but this section can also be skipped 
without loss: the remaining sections will address two different ways of developing a 
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global standpoint on immigration that compete with mine. this section is intended 
for readers who want to engage more with the details of my proposal.
Let me elaborate a bit more on the notion of proportionate use. For any state 
s the desired measure of such use would deliver a measure Vs of the value of the 
collectively owned resources on s’s territory, including the biophysical conditions 
determining the usefulness of this region for human purposes (such as climate, lo-
cation on the globe, vegetation, topography, etc). to assess the extent to which s’s 
territory is used one would divide Vs by the number Ps of people in s. Vs/Ps is 
the per-capita use rate of commonly-owned resources on s’s territory. Vs/Ps includes 
non-circulating resources (which are not literally used), such as unmined minerals 
and unextracted oil (suitably discounted). the point is to have a measure of what is 
at a society’s disposal, broadly speaking, actually and potentially, a measure of a stock 
that takes into account how readily that stock could be transformed into a flow of 
resources, rather than a measure only of the current flow. the territory of s is rela-
tively underused if Vs/Ps is bigger than the average of these values across states (so 
the average person uses a resource bundle of higher value than the average person 
in the average country). It is relatively overused if this value is under average. If Vs/
Ps is above average, co-owners elsewhere have a pro tanto claim to immigration, in 
the sense that underusing countries cannot reasonably expect others to comply with 
immigration policies until such claims are satisfied. It is then a demand of reasonable 
conduct that the state permit immigration. If a country is not underusing, others can 
be reasonably expected to accept its immigration policies (if nothing is independent-
ly problematic about them).
bull thinks my account of immigration in terms of proportionality is “half-
baked.” to begin with, bull asserts that densely populated small island states “skew” 
the average per-capita use rate of resources and spaces. Let us see what that would 
mean. that description fits bahrain, singapore, Malta, barbados, taiwan, Mauritius, 
the Maldives, tuvalu and Nauru. suppose each is absorbed by a bigger country with 
higher per-capita use-rate. (Each person in those countries has on average more re-
sources and spaces at her disposal.) suppose afterwards the per-capita use rate of the 
absorbing country is lower than before but higher than the earlier average across that 
country (prior to absorption) and the absorbed country.
as a result, the average per capita use rate across all countries increases: the 
average person in the average country now commands a higher share of resources 
and spaces. the existence of a densely populated small country where the average 
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person has a small share of resources and spaces at her proposal slightly decreases the 
world average across countries. so if densely populated small island states disappear, 
the benchmark average value with regard to which permissibility of immigration is 
assessed, rises. so it is then harder to qualify as under-using, and underusing coun-
tries have to permit less immigration than in the status quo.
Just to put the existence of small island states in perspective, suppose instead the 
number of densely populated island states increases. suppose santa Cruz del Islote 
became independent from Colombia, Hong Kong island from China, and Migingo 
island in Lake Victoria from Kenya. suppose also Malé seceded from the rest of the 
Maldives and Ebeye from the Marshall Islands. these are some of the most densely 
populated islands. We would see new states with high overuse of resources and 
spaces, much above world average. the average person in the average country then 
has less at her disposal. It would be easier for a country to be classified as underusing. 
Meeting immigration demands would be harder. Underusers must permit more im-
migration to reach proportionality.
but presumably what bull has in mind by worrying about how the existence of 
island states “skews” the average per-capita use rate of resources and spaces is the 
former case: that is, the nature of the problematic “skewing” is that the existence of 
densely populated small island countries “artificially” (as in “by way of comparison 
with a world that does not include them as independent states”) decreases the global 
use average across countries. thus the existence of such countries “artificially” in-
creases the demand for immigration elsewhere (compared to a situation without such 
states).
Why would this be problematic? One possibility is that small island states attract 
populations and generate economic success disproportionate to their size. It would 
be unfair if their existence drove up demand for immigration elsewhere since immi-
grants are not after shares of resources and spaces. but small island states would not 
be as intuitively troublesome as bull thinks. the relevant measure is decidedly not 
population density but the value for human purposes of three-dimensional spaces. 
being an island is a disadvantage for remote places in the path of storms and shunned 
by fish. but it is often distinctly advantageous for proximity to fisheries or seabed 
resources, opportunities to groom tourism, proximity and access to shipping routes, 
and because of people’s fondness for living by the water. that an area is an island 
often increases its value for human purposes, other things being equal. such places 
do not increase immigration pressure elsewhere.
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I am unsure what else could be problematic about small island states, but if it is 
that sort of issue, we must postpone a verdict on the seriousness of the problem (if 
any) until a relatively concrete way of assessing proportionate use becomes available. 
If ultimately small island states do trigger counterintuitive results, one might either 
remove them from the calculations to increase overall plausibility of the results, or 
decide not to worry too much about such distortions. In light of the general diffi-
culties in seeing through secessions it is unlikely that we will observe a significant 
increase in the number of small island states in the foreseeable future.
but why, to turn to bull’s next point, should averages be more significant than 
“relative use-rates between countries”? I take it the competing proposal bull refers to 
under “relative use-rate” is this. suppose country a has a lower per-capita use rate 
than b. so since on average people in a have less access to resources and spaces, they 
should be allowed to move to b. However, there is nothing morally relevant about 
this bilateral comparison. For now humanity’s habitat is the earth. that is the space 
through which we can readily disseminate using our technology. People in a have 
a grievance only vis-à-vis their share of the whole. this was my point against blake. 
aside from special ties between regions, we must think about immigration in terms 
of movement across the planet, rather than bilaterally.
If eventually there were only one country above the average (and so under-us-
ing), to proceed to bull’s next objection, that would be the only place to which im-
migrants have a claim. If that country were governed badly, it might well be unwise to 
relocate there. but that country could not reject people because it is “full.” Perhaps it 
would be unfair to residents if more people were to immigrate if it is because of gov-
ernmental failures that things are bad. suppose a group that handles its own security 
(and thus does not depend on its destination country’s government for protection) 
migrates to a badly run country to exploit resources, or to find a new home. they 
might make arrangements with the government, but ultimately this change is bound 
to harm the locals. there are duties of justice that may trump considerations of rea-
sonable acceptability of the sort that would permit more immigration. In particular, 
if immigration undermines a duty of assistance in institution-building, it should be 
suspended.11
bull is right that migrants nowadays usually seek to share the benefits of recent 
11. Or perhaps what bull has in mind is that scoring high on the scale of value for human purposes 
is inherently connected to bad governance. but we have no reason to think so. Much more would 
enter into the calculations to assess that kind of value than resources. any connotations with the 
resource curse would be misguided given our current state of knowledge.
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technological or cultural innovations, human-made resources I exclude from what 
should be commonly shared. It is correct that my proposal would likely change immi-
gration policies in North america (and australia) but permit more restrictive ones in 
Europe. but that seems fair to me. For demographic and thus self-interested reasons, 
Europe should encourage immigration, but at an appropriate speed to avoid complex 
and prolonged social problems intense immigration into densely populated coun-
tries could entail (Collier (2013), chapter 5). still, it is a sensible guess that any plau-
sible measure of proportionate use would find Europe much less wanting than the 
Us or australia. (With refugees it is a different story: their concerns have an urgency 
that concerns the global order as a whole.) but perhaps bull’s concern is that societal 
wealth also generates claims to shared ownership. that point I discuss in sections 8 
and 9.
Finally, bull worries that immigrants may not be able to enter since on my 
account it is a demand of reasonable conduct rather than a demand of justice that hosts 
let them in. this is a distinction I have not developed systematically here. Recall 
that in section 2, I emphasized that demands of justice are the most stringent moral 
demands, and that I have also stated the principle of justice that in OGJ I argue 
applies to humanity’s collective ownership of the earth. Policies that do not violate a 
principle of justice would (obviously) not be unjust but could still be wrong in other 
ways, and thereby not command reasonable acceptance from others. In my dwindled-
population example in section 5, would-be immigrants would not be doing anything 
unjust by dismantling surveillance systems that keep them out. but nor would the 
remaining americans by redoubling their efforts. and such an immigration policy 
could not command reasonable acceptance from others. Principles capturing reason-
able expectations allow for more compromises and have less priority than principles 
of justice. as far as the conduct of states is concerned, such principles should only 
be integrated at a later stage of development than principles of justice concerned 
with non-domestic matters, at a stage when countries can be expected to contrib-
ute to the creation of a mutually acceptable global order. but once such a stage is in 
fact reached, reasonable conduct concerned with immigration, among other things, 
should get priority over principles of justice concerned with the relative standing of 
citizens vis-à-vis each other.
bull may think principles of mere reasonable acceptability short of justice are 
wanting because people would not take them seriously. but even for matters of justice 
there is a guarantee that they will be done only to the extent that those who can make 
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it happen care about it. If people are motivated to take justice seriously they will also 
take demands of reasonable acceptability seriously. If they are not motivated to take 
demands of reasonable acceptability seriously, all will not be well with justice either.
Finally, consider bull’s insistence that if there were famines in the rest of the 
world, and everyone sought entry, the Us would be entitled as a matter of justice to use 
robotic guards to detain them and feed them their share of resources at the border. 
but that would be so only as long as their presence is not the outcome of a failure to 
provide assistance in institution-building. I made this point in section 3 when dis-
cussing refugees. It is a matter of justice that people must not be permanently kept in 
refugee camps. If there is no way of helping with the establishment of proper institu-
tions or if that simply does not happen, such people must be admitted.
sECtION VIII
somebody who finds my proposal defensible this far may still be unconvinced. 
Distribution in terms of proportionality is all well and good, objectors may say, but 
the resources with regard to which to do the calculations must include human cre-
ations. For any new generation, natural and societal resources are fundamentally 
alike: to them, all resources are manna from heaven. One response is to return to 
the very starting points for my development of humanity’s collective ownership of 
the earth in OGJ (chapter 6): the satisfaction of basic human needs matters morally; 
the resources and spaces of the earth are needed by all for survival and for all human 
activities to unfold; and these resources and spaces are nobody’s accomplishment. It 
is based on these points that, in OGJ, I argue that, in an abstract sense, humanity col-
lectively owns the earth, to articulate the view that of any two humans, neither has 
more entitlements than the other to these resources and spaces.12
societal resources differ from natural resources in three ways. to begin with, 
they are somebody’s accomplishment. secondly, social contexts enabled their creation 
by permitting the accumulation of knowledge and the emergence and nurturing of 
skills. these contexts disappear if societies collapse and vanish. but even when so-
cieties are conquered or otherwise absorbed there often remains much continuity. 
12. based on those starting points I have argued for Common Ownership as the most sensible 
conception of collective ownership, drawing on its minimalist credentials and the weaknesses of 
competing conceptions. the core idea of Common Ownership is that all co-owners ought to have an 
equal opportunity to satisfy basic needs to the extent that this turns on obtaining collectively owned 
resources. according to Common Ownership, excluding people from territory would only be unjust 
if it undermined their ability to satisfy basic needs.
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Contexts that enable the creation of artifacts involve living people differentially. 
some are involved in maintaining a culture that permits for certain kinds of pro-
duction. Others are not. thirdly, the sense in which natural resources and spaces 
are needed differs from how societal resources are needed. Newborns perish without 
access to resources and spaces, but also if they do not receive care and thus become 
beneficiaries of societal resources. but for natural resources we can, and must, natu-
rally describe the sense in which they are needed as including the earth as such. at 
this stage of geological history, the earth is hospitable to human life. some regions are 
more hospitable than others. but even for those parts that create the conditions that 
let human life flourish it would be inappropriate not to think of the favorable condi-
tions as part of an earth system.
the earth as such is humankind’s natural habitat. It is the habitable conditions of 
the earth as such, including its climate conditions, the atmosphere, and the presence 
of flora and fauna that that we need for survival, much as our species needed them to 
rise at all. as opposed to that, families, nations or other cultural niches provide the 
context where somebody needs societal resources. We do not have to think of the 
cultural sphere generated by humanity as such to say humans need societal resourc-
es as much as they need natural resources. For much of history most communities 
would have readily survived if 97% of humanity (those not closely connected to their 
cultural niche) had vanished.
One may object that the ability of a person, say, in New Jersey to use the earth 
will not be diminished if some Pacific islands sink or if volcanic eruptions level parts 
of Japan. Many natural resources and whole territories can be lost before the entire 
ecosystem is compromised. but what is crucial is that an account of the way in which 
natural resources are needed for human survival must talk about the entire ecosys-
tem of the earth. For it is only because the spaces and resources of the earth exist 
under certain climate conditions that they allow for human life to begin with. a par-
allel point about global human culture does not hold.
Objectors may nonetheless insist that, after all, for any new generation societal 
resources are like natural ones in what matters most: they did not create those resources. 
this is a central moral equivalence between natural and societal resources that does 
not disappear because of the dissimilarities. suppose Nazaire and Nicholas are born 
the same day, Nazaire in Haiti, Nicholas in the Us. both are on a par as far as natural 
resources are concerned but also regarding the societal resources of both countries: 
neither has done anything to create any of those. Nazaire and Nicholas have the same 
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claims to the heap of (natural resources/spaces + societal resources of Us + societal 
resources of Haiti). but according to my view Nicholas would be raised with entitle-
ments to the societal resources of the Us, and Nazaire with entitlements to those of 
Haiti. How could this be just?
sECtION IX
Let us look more closely at Nazaire and Nicholas. at birth they have certain 
claims. Grounded in common humanity they can make demands against the rest of 
the world. the boys also acquire the same claims to resources and spaces all other 
humans have. If per impossibile Nazaire and Nicholas entered a world without human 
imprint, they would still have the same claims the day after their birth, and on all 
subsequent days, though only against each other. but ours is a world with human 
imprint, and normally babies receive attention from somebody.
Nazaire and Nicholas also have claims against their parents. this is where they 
begin to differ. Qua humans they have the same claims against the same people (ev-
erybody). Qua children they have claims against their respective parents. Nazaire and 
Nicholas have claims to care against the people who elected to bring them into the 
world, or anyway, who made choices that immediately caused them to exist. Moreover, 
generally for children to get on in life means for them to be raised to function at least 
reasonably well in their cultural niche. therefore Nazaire and Nicholas have claims 
against their parents specifically to raise them in such a way that they can do okay in 
the cultural niche they will likely inhabit. 13
so from birth onwards, Nazaire and Nicholas should be treated as growing 
members of different communities. Communities include members of different 
ages. some are in their prime. they maintain and decide on the fate of the commu-
nity. Others fade away from it. Yet others grow into it. since it is their communities 
that shape their life prospects, humans not only have claims against their parents 
for bringing them into this world in general, and into this particular social world; 
they also have claims against their communities to be supportive throughout this 
socialization. Often young humans grow into different communities simultaneous-
13. For the importance of the fact that, at birth, children enter a social world, see also Carens (2013), 
chapter 2. One might object that the decision to bring children into the world is often far from vol-
untary, and happens as a response to communal pressure. but this would only strengthen my argu-
ment since it is part of my point to show that the community is required to assist in the up-bringing 
of the child. the case for that is the stronger the more the community is implicated in the child’s 
existence.
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ly, perhaps a religious group, a linguistic group (or two) and a political group. all 
of them have collective obligations to be appropriately supportive. Much as Nazaire 
and Nicholas have claims to parental care to different parents, they also have claims to 
communal care to different communities. Nazaire is a growing member of the political 
community of Haiti, Nicholas of the political community of the Us. this situation 
has not arisen through their choices. Nonetheless, there is great moral relevance in 
their relationships with parents and communities.
Let us return to the three differences between societal and natural resources 
identified earlier. First of all, societal resources are somebody’s accomplishment, 
whereas natural resources and spaces exist independently of human accomplish-
ment. but since human creations are somebody’s accomplishment, members of a new 
generation have differential entitlements to them although they do not have such 
entitlements to natural resources. this happens via differential claims against those 
who already have claims to societal resources (parents and communities).
the second difference is that societal resources are generated in particular con-
texts that often persist in some way and thus involve people differentially. this claim 
is not true of excavated relics of earlier civilizations, of antiques that continue to cir-
culate but are no longer produced, or of artistic creations from bygone eras. However, 
this claim is true of many things we use in our lives. this matters as we reflect on the 
differential entitlements of Nazaire and Nicholas. at birth they acquire differential 
entitlements via claims against parents. those do not hold different shares of manna 
from heaven but of human-made products that require cultural context to be made. 
anything humans make requires some skill, some understanding and often some 
infrastructure. Frequently it takes considerable skill, much understanding and a so-
phisticated infrastructure. to a large extent it is the cultural context that encourages 
or discourages the development of human capacities. this is why trade is often pro-
ductive on all sides: each side gets to take advantage of what it can do best to acquire 
goods and services others are best at providing. Many goods these days require a 
global context to be produced. but my point is not to deny that there could be such 
global contexts, but that the more local context also matters greatly.
Cultural contexts require maintenance and development. as Nazaire’s and 
Nicholas’s communities fulfill their obligations to raise children to be functioning 
members, they socialize them into becoming capable of playing some role in main-
taining and developing their cultural practices. as time passes they are expected to 
assume responsibilities. sometimes this process fails altogether. but in most cases 
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these efforts meet with some success. Eventually Nazaire and Nicholas will likely 
start participating in shared stewardship of the cultural resources of their respective 
society and hold a claim to those resources that members of the community share 
with each other, but not with those who are not part of that culture. Of course, 
would-be immigrants too are normally quite willing to acquire the relevant skills to 
help with the maintenance of societal culture on which certain goods might depend. 
therefore, one might object, this kind of consideration does not generate a reason 
to exclude would-be immigrants. but the point I am developing is a different one, 
namely, that children enter this world with the same claims to natural resources but 
with differential claims to societal resources. that is consistent with the point just 
made about would-be immigrants.
the third difference is that it makes sense to say individuals require for their sur-
vival and for all their activities the earth as a whole, but not that they require the sum 
total of human accomplishments. People require the culture-specific resources pro-
vided by their cultural niche. In addition to the two points already made, this means 
Nazaire and Nicholas acquire a formative relationship with their cultural niche: that 
niche gradually make them into the people they ultimately become. but neither 
stands in that relationship with the cultural context of the other.
before this background, and given the features that are constitutive of a politi-
cal community generally (a kind of cooperativeness and coerciveness), eventually 
Nazaire and Nicholas may raise complaints. they can protest if their environment 
favors some who have been raised in it much more than it favors others. they can 
complain about inequality of opportunity in education or excessive inequalities in 
the distribution of goods. but these are complaints against their respective commu-
nities, not against the community of the other. so appearances notwithstanding, at 
birth Nazaire and Nicholas acquire very different claims. that is because they acquire 
claims against their parents and against their communities, who are generally situ-
ated very differently. any two children do not differ at birth when it comes to entitle-
ments to natural resources. but they do when it comes to entitlements to societal 
resources. I have selected my two characters from Haiti and the Us to make my rea-
soning maximally problematic. the Us is one of the richest places on earth. Haiti is 
the poorest country in the Western hemisphere. so does my argument not merely 
glorify the status quo?
Of course, the status quo must change substantially. both Haiti and the Us must 
reform internally quite a bit to be just societies. In addition, there are obligations 
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deriving from other grounds of justice, including common humanity, collective own-
ership of the earth, shared subjection to the trading regime and membership in the 
global order. a reform of the world’s political and economic system should proceed 
along those lines. as a result of such reforms in particular Haiti would be a very dif-
ferent place. Once all that has been done, there will no longer be anything problem-
atic about acquiring differential entitlements at birth. In our world, being born in 
locations as dramatically different in terms of average life prospects as the Us and 
Haiti means being born in locations that vary in terms of how much average people 
suffer from the world’s injustices. but a proper response to that is not to argue that at 
birth any two children acquire the same entitlement to all societal resources on earth. 
a proper response is to make the world more just, for which OGJ makes a suggestion 
that I just sketched very roughly.14
sECtION X
so societal resources differ from natural resources in morally significant ways. 
since two humans readily have differential claims to societal resources, those must 
be excluded from the collectively owned pool. However, there is another objec-
tion we must explore. that objection agrees that we should determine fairness in 
the distribution of people across the earth only with regard to natural resources and 
spaces. but instead of proportionality a different manner of assessing that distribu-
tion is recommended, one focused on the multifarious ways spaces and resources 
are integrated into cultures. Political theorist avery Kolers (2009) uses the term “eth-
nogeographic community” to emphasize that over time communities adopt certain 
land-use patterns through which they control and shape space, which in turn affects 
their cultural patterns. their conception, or “ontology,” of land materializes through 
acts of bounding, controlling and shaping space. an ethnogeographic community is 
a group of people who share densely and pervasively interacting land-use patterns 
as well as an ontology of land. One distinctive ethnogeographic community is the 
bedouins. What is distinctive about them is not religion, ethnicity or language, but 
the way they interact with land.
an ethnogeographic community can lay claim to a region to the exclusion of 
14. a note for philosophically trained readers: this response, and the train of thought in sections 8 
and 9, will not satisfy those who approach this debate with non-relationist or globalist commitments 
(see OGJ, chapter 1). but with them the debate will be about those commitments to begin with. there 
is no prospect of convincing them otherwise at this stage of the extended argument.
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others if it has demonstrably achieved what Kolers calls “plenitude” in that region 
and if there is no competing right of that sort to the territory. a community achieves 
plenitude if by their standards their land-use patterns push the use of the land to 
its limits. Plenitude may be empirical or intentional. Empirical plenitude captures 
the internal diversity and complexity of land-use patterns, and how they differ from 
such patterns elsewhere. Intentional plenitude captures the projects agents have with 
regard to enhancing or maintaining empirical plenitude. Ethnogeographic commu-
nities can legitimize claims “by demonstrating that the fullness of the territory has 
been formative in their own identity, and their projects have been formative of the 
place itself” (p 137).
Kolers (2009) does not discuss immigration.15 still, his view generates a global 
standpoint to think about immigration. that standpoint prescribes whose land on-
tology matters in a region, and thereby determines when the global distribution of 
people is fair. If a community achieves plenitude by its own standards, then presum-
ably it does not have to permit immigration. Kolers explores how to assess compet-
ing claims to a region. Crucially, this way of approaching immigration differs from 
what is presupposed in the kind of proportionality my account makes central. Kolers 
denies that we need a universal criterion of use. Instead, we need a universally fair way 
of testing criteria of use. the idea of plenitude is meant to do this work.
Kolers’s account is sensible in many ways. He demonstrates how natural it is 
to make room for attachment to one’s native region in an account of immigration. 
Individuals are not merely deeply attached to the land on which they make their lives, 
but people and regions stand in interactive relationships. to the extent that com-
munities have a mentality, it has been shaped by what their region permits or forces 
them to do to get on. It matters whether people live in the mountains, by the sea or in 
the desert, and whether the climate is harsh or moderate. It matters whether people 
reside in wide-open spaces or in tough terrain that limits unimpeded movement. It 
also matters if life is shaped by persisting struggle to bring water to the house, by 
efforts to shelter from storms, by challenges to fend off water-related diseases, the 
hardship caused by infertile soils or by the fortunate absence of all of these. Just how 
15. Kolers (2012) addresses immigration. suppose group a wants to settle in region M, home to 
group b. If a already has territory L that is not full by a’s standards, this project would be illegiti-
mate. If M is full by a’s standards, the project would still be illegitimate (except if all territories are 
full, in which case there would be pressure to revise ethnogeographies and conceptions of pleni-
tude). However, if L but not M is full by a’s standards, and if a has an actionable plan (“intentional 
plenitude”) for filling it in perpetuity, then a does have a claim to move into M. the space must be 
divided up.
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all this matters depends on many factors—18th-century philosophers Montesquieu 
and Rousseau famously thought governance is one topic for which it matters—but 
all this is too large a topic for us to explore. but through such challenges, people also 
shape the land in their image, and over generations develop an intense interactive 
relationship with it.
Location in relation to other places matters as well. Certain regions were staging 
areas for armies over millennia because geographical factors limit where armies can 
pass. some regions could produce goods that proved so irresistible that strangers 
would make hazardous journeys to acquire them. Other areas are inhospitable to 
all but a few hardened natives, strategically remote, or without potential to produce 
desirable goods. these factors too matter deeply for shaping a people’s trajectory, 
and in turn create highly differential opportunities or necessities for them to interact 
with their natural environment. attachments to land run deep. Much poetry and 
countless novels make the land central. Much art celebrates it. Even to the extent that 
people voluntarily leave the region to which they are accustomed, they often do so 
with a heavy heart. If they are forced off land that has been formative to their charac-
ter, this frequently is a reason for ongoing hostility. History is replete with episodes 
of violent displacements, not least the 20th century.
In many ways, Kolers’ account and mine are complementary. My account has 
nothing to say about why people would have entitlements to living here rather than 
there. It does not characterize the ways in which people are shaped by the region they 
occupy and vice versa, or explore the importance of that process. but nor does it 
offer resistance to such thoughts. there is nothing inherently problematic from the 
standpoint of justice for people to settle down somewhere and preclude others from 
taking up the same territory. Nonetheless, such takings occur on a shared planet. It is 
that point that my theory articulates.16
Kolers targets the “anglo-american ethnogeography” he claims has been 
adopted by most mainstream anglo-american philosophers. this ethnogeography 
(p64):
16. Kolers and I diverge when it comes to the claims of people on land lost to climate change. Risse 
(2009) argues that people on disappearing island nations have a right to relocation. as individuals 
they have such a claim as a matter of justice. but my account does not deliver a collective right of a 
whole people to relocate to the same place. this is possible only if considerations of proportionate 
use permit it. the rest of the world owes these people a new home, as well as efforts to try to make 
it possible that the disruption does not become worse through relocation to an area that does not 
support their life patterns. but this will not always mean they can all relocate together. Kolers (2012) 
argues (also against Meisels (2009)) that this kind of approach, in virtue of its individualistic outlook, 
mischaracterizes the nature of the wrong inflicted on those who lose their lands.
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treats land as the passive object of human activity and ignores all forms of value 
that are not easily priced on the market. These assumptions ignore the dynamic, bi-
directional relationship between people and land—the mutually formative interac-
tions between people and their habitat—and therefore hide the fact that it is impos-
sible fairly to compare the holdings of persons across economies or ethnogeographies. 
My account does not advocate for an anglo-american ethnogeography as char-
acterized. My guiding idea is that we need to assess the value for human purposes 
of three-dimensional regions. that can sensibly be done only if we integrate forms 
of value not commonly priced on markets. at the same time, my account proposes 
non-standard evaluations that bring more components of our natural world under 
the purview of market-based pricing. However, the motivation for doing so is (only) 
that we share a planet and therefore require some way of making sense of competing 
claims to space and resources. among other things, and pace Kolers, we need com-
parability across groups to regulate immigration. My measure of proportionate use is 
pragmatic, a rough guide to obtain an assessment of when would-be immigrants can 
be fairly rejected.
Why use this measure at all then? the reply is a repetition of the insistence that 
we simply need such a measure to assess when claims to spaces and resources unac-
ceptably infringe upon claims of others. to be sure, Kolers does address cases where 
different ethnogeographies claim the same territory. but he also allows for some 
to occupy disproportionately large regions if this fits their ontology. On Kolers’s 
account groups using disproportionately large regions could not always legitimately 
turn away newcomers. but their claims always must be equally considered even vis-à-
vis claims of people who escape from over-crowding.
to be sure, the claims of such ethnogeographies often are those of indigenous 
people, and they must be integrated somehow. Given the importance of having a uni-
versal criterion, I propose to think of cultural patterns that cannot be captured by a 
pragmatic measure generating cross-cultural comparability as non-standard scenar-
ios to be accommodated. We should treat such patterns parallel to how liberal states 
should accommodate certain minority rights. Where Kolers stresses local intercon-
nectedness between land and people, I emphasize that we share a planet and need a 
criterion for a sensible division of space. For the problems we face in this century, this 
is a key perspective.
Land ontologies have often arisen when many fewer humans existed and thus 
Volume 4, Issue 2
Collective Ownership And Immigration 63
when demands on shared spaces and resources were more limited. “In the nineteenth 
and twentieth century,” writes H.G. Wells at the beginning of The Shape of Things to 
Come (1933, 17),
the story of mankind upon this planet undergoes a change of phase. It broadens 
out. It unifies. It ceases to be a tangle of more and more interrelated histories and 
it becomes plainly and consciously one history. There is a complete confluence of 
racial, social and political destinies.
Indeed, and for this reason ontologies acquired antecedently are of restricted va-
lidity in our era of high-density populations, a tendency exacerbated by the threats of 
climate change to human living spaces. to be sure, my account is much less hospita-
ble than Kolers’s to claims specifically of indigenous populations. but these normally 
are among the ontologies that have developed at times when many fewer people had 
claims to spaces and resources.
but is it not misguided to single out indigenous ontologies as the ones that 
likely have to shift due to higher populations? the earth may be overpopulated, ob-
jectors may say, not because it is overcrowded but because of excess consumption. 
Overpopulation is generated by multiplying population with consumption. It is 
the industrialized countries that overconsume. We should single out the anglo-
american ethnogeography as one developed when there were many fewer people 
and that now has to change. but these two perspectives are consistent. Just about 
all ethnogeographies must be reconsidered in the present, some because they make 
claims to inordinate amounts of space and resources, and some, including the anglo-
american ethnogeography, in virtue of misguided attitudes towards environmental 
protection.
sECtION XI
It is time to conclude. My goal has been to argue for, and elaborate on, the signifi-
cance of humanity’s collective ownership of the earth for immigration. In the process 
I have also explored some central issues in the global-justice literature and elaborated 
on some pertinent difficulties in the discussion of immigration in that literature. My 
major points are the following:
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1. Contrary to philosophers who supplement an account of the state’s norma-
tive peculiarity with an account of immigration that does not take a global stand-
point, we do need such a standpoint, and it should be one that articulates an idea 
of proportionate use of the earth.
2. Contrary to those who agree that proportionate use of the earth matters to 
immigration but insist the common pool includes societal resources, I argue that 
pool should exclude societal resources. societal resources differ importantly from 
natural ones.
3. Contrary to avery Kolers, who thinks the fair distribution of people should 
be articulated in ways different from proportionate occupation, I argue that his 
account of ethnogeographic communities does not undermine the significance of 
humanity’s collective ownership for immigration.
the debate about immigration will be among the central topics of more applied 
political philosophy in the 21st century. the standpoint of humanity’s collective 
ownership of the earth is indispensable to that debate.
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